Jacob Appelbaum (![[info]](http://l-stat.livejournal.com/img/userinfo.gif){kind=small} ioerror) wrote,@ 2008-02-21 08:58:00 |
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Cold Boot Attacks on Disk Encryption
Our project is released!
Abstract:
Contrary to popular assumption, DRAMs used in most modern computers retain their contents for seconds to minutes after power is lost, even at operating temperatures and even if removed from a motherboard. Although DRAMs become less reliable when they are not refreshed, they are not immediately erased, and their contents persist sufficiently for malicious (or forensic) acquisition of usable full-system memory images. We show that this phenomenon limits the ability of an operating system to protect cryptographic key material from an attacker with physical access. We use cold reboots to mount attacks on popular disk encryption systems — BitLocker, FileVault, dm-crypt, and TrueCrypt — using no special devices or materials. We experimentally characterize the extent and predictability of memory remanence and report that remanence times can be increased dramatically with simple techniques. We offer new algorithms for finding cryptographic keys in memory images and for correcting errors caused by bit decay. Though we discuss several strategies for partially mitigating these risks, we know of no simple remedy that would eliminate them.
Boing Boing!
C|Net coverage (photos)
New York Times
Slashdot coverage
Wired 1 and 2
LWN
BBC
The Washington Post
CRN
Ars Technica
New Scientist
The Register
Digg
Engadget
Schneier
Ed Felten has written about it (He's a coauthor).
And finally, our actual website with research paper and videos is also online.
Drudge Report
Reddit
Risks
Hack A Day
Metafilter
(Various press release places have also picked up the EFF and Princeton press release, such as EurekAlert!. As usual, the YouTube Video has the worst comments of any site yet. It's currently the number 3rd most emailed story on the New York Times website.Even my old housemate and close friend Alex Graveley)
Wikipedia article
Our project is released!
Abstract:
Contrary to popular assumption, DRAMs used in most modern computers retain their contents for seconds to minutes after power is lost, even at operating temperatures and even if removed from a motherboard. Although DRAMs become less reliable when they are not refreshed, they are not immediately erased, and their contents persist sufficiently for malicious (or forensic) acquisition of usable full-system memory images. We show that this phenomenon limits the ability of an operating system to protect cryptographic key material from an attacker with physical access. We use cold reboots to mount attacks on popular disk encryption systems — BitLocker, FileVault, dm-crypt, and TrueCrypt — using no special devices or materials. We experimentally characterize the extent and predictability of memory remanence and report that remanence times can be increased dramatically with simple techniques. We offer new algorithms for finding cryptographic keys in memory images and for correcting errors caused by bit decay. Though we discuss several strategies for partially mitigating these risks, we know of no simple remedy that would eliminate them.
Boing Boing!
C|Net coverage (photos)
New York Times
Slashdot coverage
Wired 1 and 2
LWN
BBC
The Washington Post
CRN
Ars Technica
New Scientist
The Register
Digg
Engadget
Schneier
Ed Felten has written about it (He's a coauthor).
And finally, our actual website with research paper and videos is also online.
Drudge Report
Risks
Hack A Day
Metafilter
(Various press release places have also picked up the EFF and Princeton press release, such as EurekAlert!. As usual, the YouTube Video has the worst comments of any site yet. It's currently the number 3rd most emailed story on the New York Times website.Even my old housemate and close friend Alex Graveley)
Wikipedia article
